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In the 1  980s and early 1  990s several developed economies, developing countries, and
economies in transition experienced severe banking crises.  Such proliferation of large scale
banking sector problems has raised widespread concern, as banking crises disrupt the flow of
credit to households and enterprises, reducing investment and consumption and possibly forcing
viable firms into bankruptcy.  Banking crises may also jeopardize the functioning of the
payments system and, by undermining confidence in domestic financial institutions, they may
cause a decline in domestic savings and/or a large scale capital outflow.  Finally, a systemic
crisis may force sound banks to close their doors.
In most countries, policy makers have responded to banking crises with various
interventions, ranging from loose monetary policy to the bail out of insolvent financial
institutions with public funds.  Even when they are carefully designed, however, rescue
operations have several drawbacks: they are often very costly for the budget; they may allow
inefficient banks to remain in business; they are likely to create the expectation of future bail-
outs thereby reducing incentives for adequate risk management by banks. Rescue operations
may also weaken managerial incentives when,  as it is often the case, they force healthy banks to
bear the losses of ailing institutions.  Finally, loose monetary policy to prevent banking sector
losses can be inflationary and, in countries with an exchange rate commitment, it may trigger a
speculative attack against the currency.
2Preventing the occurrence of systemic banking problems is undoubtedly a major concern
of policy makers, and understanding the mechanisms that are behind the surge in banking crises
in the last fifteen years is a first step in this direction.  Recently, a number of studies have
analyzed various episodes of banking sector distress in an effort to draw useful policy lessons
(see Section 3 below).'  Most of this work consists of case studies, and econometric analyses are
few.  Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997) use an econometric model to predict bank failures using
Mexican data for 1991-95. In a paper focused primarily on the connection between banking
crises and balance of payments crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) examine the behavior of a
number of  macroeconomic variables in the months before and after a crisis in a sample of 20
countries; using a methodology developed for predicting the turning points of business cycles,
they attempt to identify variables that act as "early warning signals" for crises.' The best signals
appear to be a loss of foreign exchange reserves, high real interest rates, low output growth, and
a decline in stock prices.
The goal of this study is to further investigate the features of the economic environment
that tend to breed banking sector fragility and, ultimately, lead to systemic banking crises.
Rather than focusing on the behavior of high frequency time series around the time of the crisis,
we study the determinants of the probability of a banking crisis in a multivariate logit
specification with annual data using a large panel including all market economies for which data
lSome  of these  studies  also  discuss  at length  the strategies  adopted  to rescue  the banking  system,  a topic that we do
not address  in this paper.
2While  this approach  provides  numerous  interesting  insights,  it is open to the criticism  that  the criteria  used to
establish  which variables  are useful  signals  are somewhat  arbitrary.
3were available in the period 1980-943.  Many countries in our sample do not experience systemic
banking crises in the period under consideration, and therefore serve as controls.  The
explanatory variables capture many of the factors suggested by the theory and highlighted by
case studies, including not only macroeconomic variables but also structural characteristics of
the economy in general and of the financial sector in particular. This approach allows us to
identify a number of interesting correlations; however, because we estimate a reduced form
relationship without deriving it from a specific structural model of the economy, such
correlations should be interpreted with caution as they may not necessarily reflect direct causal
links.
The first issue that we explore is which (if any) elements of the macroeconomic
environment are associated with the emergence of banking crises. We find that low GDP
growth, excessively high real interest rates, and high inflation significantly increase the
likelihood of systemic problems in our sample; thus, crises do not appear to be solely driven by
self-fulfilling expectations as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). This confirms the evidence
presented by Gorton (1988) on the determinants of bank runs in the U.S. during the nineteenth
century. 4 Adverse terms of trade shocks also tend to increase the likelihood of banking sector
problems, but here the evidence is weaker. The size of the fiscal deficit and the rate of
3A  methodology  similar  to our  has  been  used  to study  currency  crises  (see,  for instance,  Eichengreen  et al., 1996)
and  factors  that lead  to Fund  financial  arrangements  (Knight  and Santaella,  1994).  Economies  in transition  are
excluded  from  our  study  even  though  they  have  experienced  some  of  the  worst  banking  crises.  We  believe  that
some  of the  banking  problems  in these  economies  are  due  to the  process  of transforming  a centrally  planned
economy  into  a market  economy,  and are  therefore  of a distinctive  nature.
4 It should  be pointed  out,  however,  that  without  a theory  of how  beliefs  are  formed  in rational  expectations  models
with  multiple  equilibria,  this  evidence  cannot  rule  out  that  crises  have  a self-fulfilling  component,  since  pessimistic,
self-fulfilling  beliefs  may  tend  to emerge  when  macroeconomic  fundamentals  are  weak.
4depreciation of the exchange rate, on the other hand, do not seem to have an independent effect
in our sample.
A weak macroeconomic environment, however, is not the sole factor behind systemic
banking sector problems. Structural characteristics of the banking sector and of the economic
environment in general also play a role. Our tests show that -- as hypothesized by Calvo et al.
(1994) -- vulnerability of the system to sudden capital outflows increases the probability of a
banking crisis.  This result, however, is not robust to the specification of the regression. We also
find some evidence that problems are more likely where a larger share of credit goes to the
private sector, possibly indicating a connection between the emergence from a state of financial
repression and banking sector fragility.
Another interesting result, which is quite robust to the specification of the regression, is
that the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme makes bank unsoundness more likely.
While explicit deposit insurance should reduce bank fragility by eliminating the possibility of
self-fulfilling panics, it is well-known that it creates incentives for excessive risk-taking by bank
managers (moral hazard).  Our evidence suggests that, in the period under consideration, moral
hazard played a significant role in bringing about systemic banking problems, perhaps because
countries with deposit insurance schemes were not generally successful at implementing
appropriate prudential regulation and supervision, or because the deposit insurance schemes
were not properly designed. Also, a variable capturing the effectiveness of the legal system is
found to be significantly negatively correlated with the emergence of banking sector problems,
possibly suggesting that banking crises are more likely where outright fraud or more minor
5violations of contractual covenants, corporate charters, and prudential regulation tend to go
unpunished.
Using estimates of the cost of banking crises from Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), we test
whether the set of explanatory variables used in the logit model can also account for the severity
of each crisis. We find that most of the variables that tend to make crises more likely also tend
to make them more costly.  Since the size of the sample is small due to data limitations, these
results should be interpreted with caution.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the theory of the banking
firm to identify potential sources of systemic banking crises. Section 3 explains the design of the
econometric tests, while Section 4 contains the main results. In Section 5, we present further
results on the determinants of the severity of banking crises. Section 6 briefly details sensitivity
tests, and Section 7 concludes.
H. THE THEORY
The banking literature suggests a variety of mechanisms that can bring about banking
sector problems; in this section, these mechanisms are reviewed, while in the rest of the paper
we will use our data set to identify which of these mechanisms have played a major role in the
crises of the 1980s and early 1990s.
Banks are financial intermediaries whose liabilities are mainly short-term deposits and
whose assets are usually short and long-term loans to businesses and consumers.  When the
value of their assets falls short of the value of their liabilities, banks are insolvent.  The value of
a bank's assets may drop because borrowers become unable or unwilling to service their debt
6(credit risk). Credit risk can be reduced in various ways, such as screening loan applicants,
diversifying the loan portfolio by lending to borrowers who are subject to different risk factors,
or asking for collateral.  Appropriate screening can ensure that projects that are unprofitable ex
ante are not financed;  but risky projects that are profitable in an ex ante sense may still fail ex
post.  Also, portfolio diversification is unlikely to eliminate default risk completely, especially
for banks that operate in small countries or regions, or that specialize in lending to a particular
sector.  Finally, collateral is costly to establish and monitor, and its value is typically subject to
fluctuations.  Thus, default risk cannot be entirely eliminated without severely curtailing the role
of banks as financial intermediaries 5. If loan losses exceed a bank's compulsory and voluntary
reserves as well as its equity cushion, then the bank is insolvent.  When a significant portion of
the banking system experiences loan losses in excess of its capital, a systemic crisis occurs.
Thus, the theory predicts that shocks that adversely affect the economic performance of
bank borrowers and whose impact cannot be reduced through risk diversification should be
positively correlated with systemic banking crises.  Furthermore, for given shocks banking
systems that are less capitalized should be more vulnerable.  The empirical literature has
highlighted a number of economic shocks associated with episodes of banking sector problems:
cyclical output downturns, terms of trade deteriorations, declines in asset prices such as equity
and real estate (Gorton, 1988, Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996, Lindgren et al., 1996, Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1996).
5 The amount  of risk  that bank managers  choose  to take on, however,  is likely  to exceed  what is socially  optimal
because  of limited  liability  (Stiglitz,  1972). Hence  the need for bank regulators  to impose  minimum  capital
requirements  and other  restrictions. When  bank deposits  are insured,  incentives  to take on excessive  risk are even
stronger  (see below).  On the theory  of bank prudential  regulation,  see Dewatripont  and Tirole (1994).
7Even in the absence of an increase in non-performing loans, bank balance sheets can
deteriorate if the rate of return on bank assets falls short of the rate that must be paid on
liabilities.  Perhaps the most common example of this type of problem is an increase in short-
term interest rates that forces banks to increase the interest rate paid to depositors. 6 Because the
asset side of  bank balance sheets usually consists of loans of longer maturity at fixed interest
rates, the rate of return on assets cannot be adjusted quickly enough, and banks must suffer
reduced profits or bear losses.  All banks within a country are likely to be exposed to some
degree of interest rate risk because maturity transformation is one of the typical functions of the
banking system; furthermore, high real interest rates are likely to hurt bank balance sheets even
if they can be passed on to borrowers, as high lending rates result in a larger fraction of non-
performing loans. Thus, a large increase in short-term interest rates is likely to be a major source
of systemic banking sector problems.  In turn, the increase in short-term interest rates may be
due to various factors, such as an increase in the rate of inflation, a shift towards more restrictive
monetary policy that raises real rates, an increase in international interest rates, the removal of
interest rate controls due to financial liberalization (Galbis, 1993), or the need to defend the
exchange rate against a speculative attack (Velasco, 1987, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996)7.
Another case of rate of return mismatch occurs when banks borrow in foreign currency
and lend in domestic currency.  In this case, an unexpected depreciation of the domestic
currency threatens bank profitability.  Many countries have regulations limiting banks' open
6 According  to Mishkin  (1996),  most banking  panics  in the U.S.  were preceded  by an increase  in short  term interest
rates.
7On the determinants  of high interest  rates  in developing  and  transition  economies  see Brock  (1995).
8foreign currency positions, but sometimes such regulations can be circumvented (Garber, 1996).
Also, banks that raise funds abroad may choose to issue domestic loans denominated in foreign
currency,  thus eliminating the open position.  In this case, foreign exchange risk is shifted onto
the borrowers, and an unexpected devaluation would still affect bank profitability negatively
through an increase in non-performing loans. Foreign currency loans were a source of banking
problems in Chile in 1981 (Akerlof and Romer, 1993), in Mexico in 1995 (Mishkin, 1996), in
the Nordic countries in the early 1  990s (Drees and Pazarba4,oglu, 1995, Mishkin, 1996), and in
Turkey in 1994.
When bank deposits are not insured, a deterioration in the quality of a bank's asset
portfolio may trigger a run, as depositors rush to withdraw their funds before the bank declares
bankruptcy.  Because bank assets are typically illiquid, runs on deposits accelerate the onset of
insolvency.  In fact, as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have shown, bank runs may be self-
fulfilling, i.e. they may take place simply because depositors believe that other depositors are
withdrawing their funds even in the absence of an initial deterioration of the bank's  balance
sheet.  The possibility of self-fulfilling runs makes banks especially vulnerable financial
institutions.  A run on an individual bank should not threaten the banking system as a whole
unless partially informed depositors take it as a signal that other banks are also at risk
(contagion). 8 In these circumstances, bank runs turn into a banking panic.
8 For an in-depth  discussion  of the theory  of bank runs, see Bhattacharya  and Thakor  (1994).
9Bank runs should not occur when deposits are insured against the risk of bank
insolvency; deposit insurance may be explicit, i.e. banks may purchase full or partial insurance
on behalf of depositors from a government agency or from a private insurer, or it may be
implicit, if depositors (correctly) believe that the government will either prevent the bank from
failing or that, in case of failure,  it would step in and compensate depositors for their losses.  If
the premia do not fully reflect the riskiness of  bank portfolios, then the presence of deposit
insurance creates incentives for taking on excessive risk (moral hazard) (Kane, 1989). The
effects of moral hazard are likely to be negligible when the banking system is tightly controlled
by the government or by the Central Bank.  On the other hand, when financial liberalization
takes place -- as it has been in many countries in the last 15 years -- the opportunities for risk-
taking increase substantially.  Thus, if financial liberalization takes place in countries with
deposit insurance, and it is not accompanied by a well-designed and effective system of
prudential regulation and supervision, then excessive risk taking on the part of bank managers is
possible, and banking crises due to moral hazard may occur. To summarize, the theory is
ambiguous as to the sign of the correlation between deposit insurance and banking crises: on the
one hand, when deposits are insured self-fulfilling crises should not occur; on the other hand,
banking crises due to adverse macroeconomic shocks could be more likely because bank
managers choose riskier loan portfolios.
In countries in which the banking sector is liberalized but bank supervision is weak and
legal remedies against fraud are easy to circumvent, banking crises may also be caused by
widespread "looting":  bank managers not only may invest in projects that are too risky, but they
may invest in projects that are sure failures but from which they can divert money for personal
10use.  Akerlof and Romer (1993)  claim that looting behavior was at the core of the savings and
loan crisis in the U.S. and of the Chilean banking crisis of the late 1970s. Thus, a weak legal
system that allows fraud to go unpunished should increase the probability of a banking crisis.
A sudden withdrawal of bank deposits with effects similar to those of a bank run may
also take place after a period of large inflows of foreign short-term capital, as indicated by the
experience of a number of Latin American, Asian, and Eastern European countries in the early
1990s. Such inflows, often driven by the combined effect of capital account liberalization and
high domestic interest rates due to inflation stabilization policies, result in an expansion of
domestic credit (Khamis, 1996).  When foreign interest rates rise, domestic interest rates fall, or
when confidence in the economy wavers, foreign investors quickly withdraw their funds, and
the domestic banking system may become illiquid (Calvo et al., 1994). As discussed by
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) among others, in countries with a fixed exchange rate banking
problems may also be triggered by a speculative attack against the currency:  if a devaluation is
expected to occur soon, depositors (both domestic and foreign) rush to withdraw their bank
deposits and convert them into foreign currency deposits abroad, thus leaving domestic banks
illiquid. 9
Banking sector problems may also follow successful stabilization in countries with a
history of high inflation; as shown by English (1996), chronic high inflation tends to be
associated with an overblown financial sector, as financial intermediaries profit from the float on
9  This  mechanism  seems  to have  been at work in Argentina  in 1995:  following  the Mexican  devaluation  in
December  1994,  confidence  in the Argentinean  peso plunged,  and the banking  system  lost 16  percent of its deposits
in the first quarter  of 1995  (IMF, 1996).
11payments. When inflation is drastically reduced, banks see one of their main sources of revenue
disappear, and generalized banking problems may follow'".
111. THE EMPIRICAL  SPECIFICATION  AND  THE CHOICE  OF EXPLANATORY  VARIABLES
The sample
Because of data availability, our study is limited to the 1980-94 period.  To determine
which countries to include, we began with all the countries in the IFS; we then eliminated
centrally planned economies and economies in transition because the interrelation between the
banking system and the rest of the economy is likely to be of a distinctive nature in these
countries.  Other countries had to be eliminated because the main macroeconomic and financial
data series were missing or mostly incomplete. A few countries, such as Bangladesh and Ghana,
were left out because their banking system was in a state of chronic distress for the entire period
under consideration. Finally, three countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia) were excluded
because they are outliers with respect to two of the regressors that we use (inflation and the real
interest rate)." This process of elimination left us with a number of countries ranging from a
maximum of 65 to a minimum of 45 depending on the specification of the regression. 12 A list of
the countries included in the sample can be found in the data appendix.
tO Recently, banking sector difficulties in Brazil and Russia have been explained in this way (Lindgren et aL, 1996).
l' As a robustness check, we have also estimated the model including the three outliers. See Section 5 below.
12 Due to lack of data, for some countries the observations included in the panel do not cover the entire 1981-94
period.
12The econometric model
We estimate the probability of a banking crisis using a multivariate logit model.  In
each period the country is either experiencing a crisis, or it is not.  Accordingly, our
dependent variable, the crisis dummy, takes the value zero if there is no crisis, and takes the
value one if there is a crisis. Since we cannot predict a crisis with certainty, we estimate the
probability that a crisis will occur at a particular time in a particular country, and we
hypothesize that this probability is a function of a vector of n explanatory variables X(i, t).
The choice of explanatory variables is discussed below. Let P(i, t) denote a dummy variable
that takes the value of one when a banking crisis occurs in country i and time t and a value
of zero otherwise. p is a vector of n unknown coefficients and F(p'X(i, t)) is the cumulative
probability distribution function evaluated at p'X(i, t). Then, the log-likelihood function of
the model is:
Ln L =  Et-  LT  Yj=l  n{P(i,t)ln[F(P3X(i,t))]  + (1-P(i,t)) ln[l-  F(P3X(i,t))]}.
In modeling the probability distribution we use the logistic functional form.'3 When
interpreting the regression results it is important to remember that the estimated coefficients
do not indicate the increase in the probability of a crisis given a one-unit increase in the
corresponding explanatory variables.  Instead, in the above specification, the coefficients
reflect the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on ln(P(i,t)/(l -P(i,t)).  Therefore, the
13  The  logistic  distribution  is commonly  used  in studying  banking  difficulties.  See  for  example,  Cole  and
Gunther  (1993)  and Gonzalez-Herrnosillo,  et al (1997).
13increase in the probability depends upon the original probability and thus upon the initial
values of all the independent variables and their coefficients.  While the sign of the
coefficient does indicate the direction of the change, the magnitude depends on the slope of
the cumulative distribution function at ,3'X(i,t). In other words, a change in the explanatory
variable will have different effects on the probability of a crisis depending on the country's
initial crisis probability. Under the logistic specification, if a country has an extremely high
(or low) initial probability of crisis, a marginal change in the independent variables has little
effect on its prospects, while the same marginal change has a greater effect if the country's
probability of crisis is in an intermediate range.
After the onset of a banking crisis, the behavior of some of the explanatory variables
is likely to be affected by the crisis itself.  For instance, as described below one ot the
explanatory variables used in the regressions  is the credit-to-GNP ratio; this ratio is likely to
fall as a result of the banking crisis, and the reduction in credit may, in turn, affect another
explanatory variable, GNP growth.  Another regressor that may be affected by the banking
crisis is the real interest rate, which is likely to fall due to the loosening of monetary policy
that often accompanies banking sector rescue operations. Clearly, these feed-back effects
would muddle the relationships that we try to identify, so in a first set of regressions we
eliminate from the panel all observations following a banking crisis. The drawback of this
approach is that we lose episodes of multiple crises, and that many observations for the late
1  980s and early 1  990s are excluded from the sample.
As an alternative approach, we identify the year in which each banking crisis ended
based on information available in existing case studies (see below), and in a second set of
14regressions we include in the panel all observations following the end date.  This panel, of
course, is considerably larger than the first, and it includes repeated banking crises. The
drawback of this approach is that determining when the effects of a banking crisis come to
an end is quite difficult, so the choice of which observations to include in the panel is
somewhat arbitrary.  Furthermore, in this set of regressions the probability that a crisis
occurs in a country that had problems in the past is likely to differ from that of a country
where no crisis ever occurred. To take this dependence into account, we include different
additional regressors in the estimated equations such as the number of past crises, the
duration of the last spell, and the time since the last crisis.
When using panel data, country fixed effects are often included in the empirical
model to allow for the possibility that the dependent variable may change cross-country
independently of the explanatory variables included in the regression. In logit estimation,
including country fixed effects would require omitting from the panel all countries that did
not experience a banking crisis during the period under consideration (Greene, 1997, p. 899).
In our case, this would imply disregarding a large amount of available infornation,  since --
as discussed below -- countries that did not experience crisis are more than half of the total.
Furthermore, limiting the panel to countries with crises would produce a biased sample.
Given these drawbacks, we believe that estimating the model using the full sample but
without fixed effects is the preferable approach." 4 However, as a further robustness check
14 An  alternative  strategy  would  be to estimate  a probit  model  with  random  effects,  since  such  a methodology  would
be compatible  with  using  the  entire  data  set.  However,  this  model  produces  unbiased  estimates  only  if the  random
effects  are  uncorrelated  with  the  regressors,  which  is unlikely  to be  true  in practice  (Judge  et al., 1985,  p. 527).
15we have also estimated a fixed effects version of the model using only countries that
experienced a crisis. The results are discussed in Section VI below.
The banking crisis variable
A key element in our study is the construction of the banking crisis dummy variable.
To do it, we have identified and dated episodes of banking sector distress during the period
1980-94 using primarily four recent studies:  Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1996), Lindgren et al. (1996), and Sheng (1995).  Taken together, these studies
form a comnprehensive  survey of banking sector fragility around the world; from our
perspective, it was important to distinguish between fragility in general and crises in
particular, and between localized crises and systemic crises.  To this end, we established --
somewhat arbitrarily -- that for an episode of distress to be classified as a full-fledged crisis
in our panel at least one of the following four conditions had to hold:
1.  The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system exceeded
10%;
2.  The cost of the rescue operation was at least 2% of GDP;
3.  Banking sector problems resulted in a large scale nationalization of banks;
4.  Extensive bank runs took place  or emergency measures such as deposit freezes,
prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were enacted by the
government in response to the crisis.
Therefore, the premise behind our work is that when one or more of the above
conditions obtains the problem is of a systemic nature and should be considered a banking
crisis, while when none of the above occurs the problem is localized and/or relatively minor.
16The criteria  above were sufficient  to classify  as a crisis or not a crisis  almost  all of the
fragility  episodes  identified  by the literature.  In a few cases,  however,  we had insufficient
information  and made a decision  based on our best  judgement. According  to our
classification,  there were 31 episodes  of systemic  banking  crises  (out of 546 observations)  in
the largest of our samples  (Table 1).  23 crises  took place in developing  countries  and 8 in
developed  countries.  Of the crises  in developing  countries,  6 were in Latin  America,  7 in
Asia, 7 in Africa,  and 3 in the Middle  East. Thus, our sample  includes  a relative  diverse  set
of economies.
The explanatory variables
Our choice of explanatory  variables  reflects both the theory of the determninants  of
banking crises summarized in Section 2 above and data availability. A list of the variables
and their sources is in the data appendix.  To capture adverse macroeconomic shocks that
hurt banks by increasing the share of non-performing loans, we use as regressors the rate of
growth of real GDP, the external terms of trade, and the real short-term interest rate.  High
short-term real interest rates also affect bank balance sheets adversely if banks cannot
increase  their lending  rates quickly  enough,  as explained  in Section  2. Finally,  the real
interest rate may also be considered a proxy for financial liberalization, as Galbis (1993)
found that the liberalization process tends to lead to high real rates.  Financial liberalization,
in turn, may increase banking sector fragility because of increased opportunities for
17excessive risk-taking and fraud. 15 Pill and Pradhan (1995) find that the variable that best
captures the extent to which financial liberalization has progressed is the ratio of credit to the
private sector to GDP. Accordingly, we introduce this variable as a regressor in our
equations. Another variable that can proxy the progress with financial liberalization is the
change in the credit-to-GDP ratio. Since case studies point to a number of episodes in which
banking sector problems were preceded by strong credit growth, we experiment with various
lags of this variable.
Inflation is introduced as an explanatory variable because it is likely to be
associated with high nominal interest rates, and because it may proxy macroeconomic
mismanagement which adversely affects the economy and the banking system through
various channels.  Because stabilization from chronic inflation may lead to a reduction in the
size of the banking system which, in turn, may take place through a banking crisis, we also
introduce the change in the rate of inflation as a regressor.  In addition, the rate of
depreciation of the exchange rate is used to test the hypothesis that banking crises may be
driven by excessive foreign exchange risk exposure either in the banking system itself or
among bank borrowers.  To test whether systemic banking sector problems are related to
sudden capital outflows in countries with an exchange rate peg we introduce as a regressor
the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves. According to Calvo (1996), this ratio is a good
predictor of a country's vulnerability to balance-of-payments crises.
i5 We  explored  the  possibility  of constructing  a financial  liberalization  dummy  using  country  by  country
information  on the  timing  of liberalization;  however,  we abandoned  the  idea  because  for  most  countries  in our  panel
the transition  to a more liberalized  regime  was a very  gradual  process,  sometimes  taking  a decade  or more.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) find that a financial liberalization dummy variable tends to predict the occurrence of
banking crises in their sample of 20 countries.
18The government surplus as a percentage of GDP captures the financing needs of the
central government. This variable may matter for two reasons: first, govermments  strapped
for funds often postpone measures to strengthen bank balance sheets, with the result that
relatively small problems grow to systemic proportions. According to Lindgren et al. (1996):
" Supervisors often are preventedfrom  intervening in banks because this would
bring problems out in the open and 'cause' expenditure. Typicaljustifications for  inaction
are that 'there is no room in the budget' or that the  fiscal situation is 'too weak' to allow for
any consideration of banking problems. " (p. 166)
Even when government officials are prepared to intervene despite budgetary
difficulties, the public may believe that they are not, and bank runs may compound the
initial problems turning them into a full-fledged crisis.  A second reason for including the
government fiscal position in the regressions is that failure to control the budget deficit may
be a serious obstacle to successful financial liberalization (McKinnon, 1991). Foiled
attempts at financial liberalization may, in turn, create problems for the banking system.
Adverse macroeconomic circumstances should be less likely to lead to crises in
countries where the banking system is liquid. To capture liquidity we use the ratio of bank
cash and reserves to bank assets.  We also construct a dummy variable that takes a value of
one in countries/years in which an explicit deposit insurance scheme is in place.  As
discussed in Section 2, the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous, because explicit
deposit insurance should reduce the incidence of bank runs but it is likely to increase risk
due to moral hazard.  Finally, banking sector problems may be due to widespread fraud, or
to weak enforcement of loans contracts and/or of prudential regulation in countries where
19the legal system is not very efficient; to test this hypothesis, we introduce as regressors
indexes of the quality of the legal system, of contract enforcement, and of the bureaucracy,
as well as GDP per capita. These proxies may also capture the government's administrative
capability which, in turn, is likely to be positively correlated with the effectiveness of
prudential supervision of the banking system. Thus, low values of the proxies may mean
more opportunities for moral hazard.
IV.  THE  RESULTS
Tables 2 and 3 contain the main results of our econometric investigation. Table 2
reports four regressions using the panel that excludes observations following the first
banking crisis, while Table 3 reports the same regressions for the panel in which
observations following the end of a crisis episodes are included. The first specification
includes only the macroeconomic variables and GDP per capita, and it encompasses the
largest set of countries.  In the second specification we add variables capturing some
characteristics of the banking sector; in the third regression the deposit insurance dummy
variable is included. The fourth regression relies on the smallest sample, and it includes the
"law and order" index.
Overall  model performance  and prediction  accuracy
The quality of the model specification is assessed based on three criteria
recommended by Amemiya (1981): model chi-square, Akaike's  information criterion (AIC),
20and in-sample classification accuracy. The model chi-square tests the joint significance of
the regressors by comparing the likelihood of the model with that of a model with only the
intercept; as shown in Tables 2 and 3, in all the specifications the hypothesis that the
coefficients of the independent variables are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the one
percent significance level. The AIC criterion is computed as minus the log-likelihood of the
model plus the number of parameters being estimated, and it is therefore smaller for better
models. This criterion is useful in comparing models with different degrees of freedom. The
regressions including only observations before the first crisis seem to perform better, and
model four appears to be the best based on AIC.
To assess the prediction accuracy of the various specifications, we report the
percentage of crises that are correctly classified, the percentage of non-crises that are
correctly classified, and the total percentage of observations that are correctly classified. The
model appears to perform fairly well:  the overall classification accuracy varies between 67
percent and 84 percent, while up to 70 percent of the banking crises are accurately classified.
It should be pointed out that the percentage of non-crisis observations that are
correctly classified tends to downplay the performance of the model, because in a number of
episodes the estimated probability of a crisis increases significantly a few years before the
episode begins and those observations are considered as incorrectly classified by the
accuracy criterion. To illustrate this point, Table 4 reports more details about the
classification accuracy of the best of the specifications, namely specification (3) in the
second panel. While 26 percent of the crisis episodes were not correctly classified by the
model, in 35 percent of the cases the estimated probability jumps up exactly in the year of
21the crisis;  in 26 percent additional cases the model classifies as a crisis also the year before
the crisis began, and, finally, in another 13 percent of the episodes the estimated probability
of  crisis jumps as early as 'three years prior to the starting date. These results suggest that the
elements that contribute to systemic banking sector fragility may be in place one or more
years before problems become manifest.
Significance of the explanatory variables' 6
In both panels, low GDP growth is clearly associated with a higher probability of a
banking crisis, confirming that developments in the real side of the economy have been a
major source of systemic banking sector problems in the 1980s and 1990s. Also a decline in
the terms of trade appears to worsen banking sector unsoundness, but this variable is
significant only in two of the specifications and only at the 10 percent confidence level.
GDP growth loses significance if it is lagged by one period, indicating that negative shocks
work their way to bank balance sheets relatively quickly. Another possible interpretation is
that the banking crisis itself causes a decline in the contemporaneous rate of GDP growth as
credit to the economy withers. This interpretation would imply that causality runs in the
opposite direction than that suggested. However, since credit goes to finance future
production and not current production, it seems likely that a decline in credit would affect
GDP only with a lag. This interpretation is also supported by the findings of Kaminsky and
16 The results  of regressions  using specifications  including  alternative  explanatory  variables  not reported  in Tables 2
and 3 are described  in section  VI below.
22Reinhart (1996), who examine monthly data around the time of a banking crisis and find that
the decline in GDP growth tends to precede the onset of the banking crisis by about 8
months. 17
Both the real interest rate and inflation are highly significant in all the specifications
and have the expected sign, confirming the well-known vulnerability of the banking system
to nominal and real intetest rate shocks; on the other hand, the behavior of the exchange rate
does not have an independent effect on the likelihood of a banking sector crisis once
inflation and terms of trade changes are controlled for." 8 The fiscal surplus is also not
significant. External vulnerability as measured by the ratio of M2 to reserves significantly
increases the probability of a crisis in most of the specifications, as predicted by the theory.
This variable, however, tends to loose significance when the surplus-to-GDP variable is
omitted.  19
In the previous sections we conjectured that countries where the banking sector has a
larger exposure to private sector borrowers should be more vulnerable to banking crises.
This conjecture finds some support in our regression results, but the level of significance is
low except in one of the specifications. Also the other financial variables (credit growth and
the liquidity variable) do not develop a consistently significant coefficient in all of the
specifications, although the liquidity variable is significant in the fourth regression using the
17 Recall  that our  panels exclude  years in  which banking  crises  are under  way, so periods in which  growth is likely
to be negatively  affected  by the decline  in credit  due to the crisis  are not in the sample.
18 When inflation  is excluded  from the regression,  the coefficient  of the rate  of depreciation  becomes
significant  and negative  in most of the specifications.
19  On other  proxies  of external  vulnerability,  see Section  VI  below.
23second panel, and credit growth is significant (and positive) if lagged by two periods in the
third specification of the first panel. Thus, there is some evidence that a boom in credit
precedes banking crises, but the evidence is not very strong.
As predicted by the theory, low values of the "law and order" index, which should
proxy more opportunities to loot and/or a lower ability to carry out effective prudential
supervision, are associated with a higher likelihood of a crisis.  It should be noted, however,
that it is difficult to disentangle the effect of this index from that of GDP per capita, given
the high degree of correlation between the two variables in our sample.  Finally, the deposit
insurance dummy variable has a significant positive sign in both panels. Thus, the presence
of an explicit insurance scheme, although it may have reduced the incidence of self-fulfilling
banik  runs, appears to have worsened banking sector fragility through moral hazard. This
result may be taken as evidence that no deposit insurance or perhaps implicit deposit
insurance is preferable from the point of view of minimizing banking sector fragility;
however, it may more simply reflect weaknesses in the design and implementation of
deposit insurance schemes in our sample of countries. 20 Clearly, more work is needed to sort
out this issue.
As explained in Section III above, because the empirical model is non-linear the
estimated coefficients do not measure the percentage change in the estimated probability of a
crisis associated with a given percentage change in the explanatory variable, as in the
standard linear regression model.  Rather, the impact of a change in each explanatory
20 On  the design  and implementation  of deposit  insurance  schemes,  see  Garcia  (1995)
24variable depends upon the initial values of all the independent variables and their
coefficients. To gain some insight on the relative impact of each explanatory variable, using
estimated coefficients from equation (3) in the multicrisis sample we have computed
elasticities for a specific and much-studied episode, the Mexican banking crisis of 1994. As
shown in Table 5, the largest elasticities are those of the rate of output growth and of the
share of private credit to GNP (the latter variable, though, is significant only at the 10
percent confidence level). The real interest rate and lagged credit growth have elasticities of
around 0.5, while the external vulnerability variable (the ratio of  M2 to reserves) and the
rate of inflation have elasticities of 0.27 and 0.22 respectively.  A switch from explicit to no
deposit insurance would have decreased the probability of a crisis by over 60 percent. This
large impact, of course, is due to the fact that a change in the dummy variable from one to
zero represents a 100 percent decline. As pointed out in the introduction, these numbers have
to be interpreted with caution, since the coefficients come from a reduced form equation and
we do not provide a structural model that makes explicit the connections among the various
explanatory variables.
V. THE COST OF BANKING CRISES
The approach taken so far treats all banking crises as uniform events. In practice,
however, the crises in our panel were of different severity. In this section, we test whether
the set of macroeconomic, structural, and institutional variables that are associated with the
occurrence of  banking crises can also explain observed differences in the severity of the
25crisis. We measure the severity of the crises by their cost (as a share of GDP) using the
estimates in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), which are available for 24 of the 31 crisis
episodes in our sample. These estimates reflect the fiscal cost of each episode.  The
explanatory variables are measured in the year in which the crisis begins. In interpreting the
results it is important to take into account that the cost of a crisis is an imperfect measure of
the severity of the problems because it is influenced also by how well monetary authorities
and bank supervisors deal with the crisis. Thus, some of the explanatory variables may be
correlated with factors affecting the quality of the policy response rather than with the
severity of the crisis.2'
Table 6 reports the regression results. The coefficients are estimated using OLS, and
the standard errors are White's heteroskedasticity-consistent measures. Because the degrees
of freedom are few, these results should be taken with caution. Overall, the variables that are
significantly correlated with the probability of a crisis are also significantly correlated with
the cost of a crisis: among the macro variables, low GDP growth, adverse terms of trade
changes, high real interest rates, and high inflation tend to increase the cost of a crisis.
Vulnerability to a balance-of-payments crisis, a larger share of credit to the private sector,
and lagged credit growth are also significant and of the expected sign (although credit
growth is significant only in one of the two specifications in which it is included); the
liquidity variable is significant only if the other financial variables are excluded. The deposit
21 For a review of recent episodes  of bank restructuring,  see Dziobek  and Pazarba§toglu  (1997).
26insurance dummy and the "law and order" index are also significant,  indicating that the
presence of explicit deposit insurance may not only make banking crises more likely, but it
may also make the such crises more expensive to clean up. Conversely, an effective legal
system that sanctions fraudulent behavior is likely to reduce both the occurrence of systemic
banking problems and their cost.
Finally, a variable capturing the length of the crisis episodes is negatively correlated
with the cost. Thus, crises that are cleaned up more quickly appear to be also the most
expensive. One possible explanation of this result is that more severe crises force policy
makers to take quick and drastic action and, therefore, result in a speedier resolution of the
problems. Another interpretation could be that rescue operations that put the banking system
back on its feet relatively quickly require more budgetary resources, perhaps because they
involve an across-the-board bail out instead of more selective intervention aimed at
separating out efficient banks from inefficient institutions.
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In classifying episodes of banking sector fragility as crises or non-crises we have
relied on somewhat arbitrary cutoffs; thus, it is important to verify that the main results of
the analysis are not sensitive to small changes in the threshold values for the ratio of non-
performing loans to bank assets and for the cost of the crisis as a share of GDP. To this end,
the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 were replicated using a more restrictive definition of a
crisis (ratio of non-performing loans to bank assets above 15 percent and/or cost of crises
above 3 percent of GDP) and for a sample with a less restrictive definition (ratio of non-
27performing loans to bank assets above 5 percent and/or cost of crises above 1 percent of
GDP). In the set of regressions that exclude years after the first crisis, the more restrictive
criterion reduces the number of crises to 24 in model I and to 14 in model 4, while the less
restrictive criterion increases the number to 30 in model 1 and to 20 in model 4. In spite of
these changes, all of the results in Tables 2 and 3 remain essentially unaltered. Not
surprisingly, the model with the more stringent definition of a banking crisis seems to be the
best in terms of goodness of fit, since with the more stringent definition it becomes easier to
identify a crisis from a non-crisis.
To scrutinize the robustness of our results further, we have run two more sets of
regressions in which we do not exclude from the sample years in which banking crises were
ongoing.  In the first set of regressions, those years are treated as crisis years, while in the
second set they are treated as non-crisis years.  The results of these regressions look very
much like those of Table 3, in which years after a crisis has ended are included in the panel.
We also estimated the various specifications including the three outlier countries
(Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia). In this case, the rate of  inflation and the real interest rate
are no longer significant, and some of the other macroeconomic variables become slightly
less significant. To gain more insight on the role of inflation and of real interest rates, we
estimated a specification in which dummies for the three outlier countries are interacted with
inflation and the real interest rate. The dummies are significant and negative in most
specifications, suggesting the presence of a "threshold effect", i.e. that after inflation and
real interest rates have reached a certain peak further changes no longer affect the probability
of a banking crisis.
28We have run specifications using the deviation of the GDP growth rate from its
country mean instead of the GDP growth rate to test whether a more accurate measure of
output shock changed the results; we found that nothing changed. To test whether
uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment significantly increases banking sector
fragility, we also introduced measures of volatility for GDP growth and inflation measured
by the coefficient of variation of each variable by country; neither variable was significant,
perhaps because  more sophisticated measures of volatility are needed .To test for the
possible presence of non-linearities, we ran a specification including the square of the rate of
inflation and of the real interest rate, but these terms were not significant. Also, we
experimented with different proxies for balance-of-payments vulnerability, such as the ratio
of foreign exchange liabilities (gross and net) of the banking sector to reserves, and the
capital account surplus; these variables, however, are less significant than the M2-to-
reserves ratio.
Indexes of corruption, quality of contract enforcement, quality of the bureaucracy,
and delays in the justice system, are less significant than the "law and order" index. A
specification including the depth of the banking system as measured by the ratio of bank
assets to GDP instead of the liquidity of the banking system does not perform any better than
the regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3, and the ratio of M3 to GDP also is not significant
in any of the regressions. We have also split the sample between developing and developed
countries; interestingly, the deposit insurance dummy and the "law and order" index become
more strongly significant in the sample of developing countries.
29Finally, as discussed in Section III above we have estimated a version of the
model including country fixed effects for a restricted panel including only countries that
experienced a banking crisis in the period under consideration. Because of collinearity
between the "law and order" index and the country dummies, specifications including this
variable did not converge, so the results described below refer to specifications that do not
include the index.
The performance of the model as measured by chi-square is as good as in the case
without fixed effects, while the AIC criterion suggests a somewhat worse performance; the
specification including deposit insurance is still the best based on the AIC. Classification
accuracy drops somewhat, but it is still quite good (in the best specification, 89 percent of
non-crisis observations and 68 percent of crisis observations are correctly classified).
Concerning the significance of individual explanatory variables, the main differences from
the results in Tables 2 and 3 are as follows: the change in the terms of trade, which was
marginally significant in a few of the specifications without fixed effects, now is no longer
significant. The inflation variable, while it is still significant at 5 percent in the first two
specifications for the panel excluding all years after a crisis, is no longer significant if the
deposit insurance variable is included. Furthermore, in the panel including the years after the
crisis has ended significance drops to 15 percent. As in the model without fixed effects, the
significance of the financial variables is sensitive to the specification; the variable capturing
vulnerability to balance of payments crises, M2-to-reserves, is now significant in only one of
the regressions, while the share of credit to the private sector becomes more significant. Of
the institutional variables, GDP per capita is significant at the 10 percent level, while the
30deposit insurance dummy variable is still significant at the 5 percent level in the first panel,
while significance drops to 15 percent in the second panel. The latter result, however,
appears to be the effect of dropping non-crisis countries from the panel rather than of the
inclusion of country dummies. Furthernore,  the inclusion of deposit insurance still
considerably improves the performance of the regression. Thus, estimation of the smaller
panel with fixed effects does not yield a substantially different picture of the factors
associated with systemic banking crises than that reported in Tables 2 and 3.
VIYl CONCLUSIONS
Since the early 1  980s systemic banking sector problems have emerged repeatedly  all
over the world, and the need to understand the connections between banking sector fragility
and the economy is all the more urgent. The now numerous case studies indicate that, while
experiences vary quite substantially across countries and over time, there may be factors
common to all banking crises. This paper attempts to identify some of these common threads
by estimating a multivariate logit model for a large panel of countries.
We find that banking crises tend to emerge when the macroeconomic environment is
weak; in particular, low GDP growth is significantly and robustly correlated with increased
risk to the banking sector. Vulnerability to aggregate output shocks is not necessarily a sign
of an inefficient banking system, as the role of banks as financial intermediaries by its very
nature involves some risk-taking. However, banks could hedge some of the credit risk due to
fluctuations of the domestic economy by lending abroad. From this perspective, the
31expansion of cross-border banking activities should improve the strength of banks all over
the world. Small developing countries, whose output is typically more volatile, should
especially benefit from increased internationalization. Entry by foreign banks could also be
beneficial by increasing competition and putting pressure on local authorities to upgrade the
institutional framework for banking activities, although lack of knowledge of local firns  and
of domestic market conditions may constitute a significant barrier.  In future work, we plan
to explore in more depth the connection between volatility, country size, and banking sector
fragility.
Our results also indicate that an increased risk of banking sector problems may be
one of the consequences of a high rate of inflation, possibly because the high and volatile
nominal interest rates associated with high inflation make it difficult for banks to perform
maturity transformation. Thus, restrictive monetary policies that keep inflation in check are
desirable from the point of view of banking sector stability. However, when such policies
are implemented in the context of an inflation stabilization program they may lead to a sharp
increase in real interest rates; as our empirical evidence shows, high real rates tend to
increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. Thus, the design and implementation of effective
inflation stabilization programs should be accompanied by a careful evaluation of the impact
on the domestic banking system, and, in countries where the banking system appears weak,
the benefits of inflation stabilization should be carefully weighted against the costs of a
possible banking crisis.
High real interest rates may be the consequence of a host of factors other than
inflation stabilization policies (Brock, 1995). Among these factors is financial liberalization
32which, in turn, is often named as one of the culprits for banking sector fragility in the policy
debate. We have found some (not very strong) evidence that a proxy for the degree of
financial liberalization significantly increases the likelihood of banking crises even when
real interest rates are controlled for;  we plan to explore this issue further in future extensions
by developing more accurate indicators of financial liberalization.
Our regressions indicate rather unambiguously that the presence of an explicit
deposit insurance scheme tends to increase the probability of systemic banking problems.
This suggests that, while deposit insurance may reduce the incidence of self-fulfilling
banking panics, it introduces a significant degree of moral hazard which often has not been
successfully curbed through appropriate design of the insurance scheme or through effective
prudential supervision and regulation.  Thus, reducing the moral hazard induced by deposit
insurance should be a priority for policy-makers interested in strengthening the banking
system; also, opting for an implicit rather than explicit deposit insurance scheme may be
preferable while the administrative capability needed to enforce a system of prudential
regulation is being created. To explore this issue further, we plan to test whether banking
sector fragility is affected by specific features of the deposit insurance system such as the
extent of the coverage, the type of premia charged to banks, the public or private nature of
the scheme, the presence of coinsurance and deductibles, and others.
Our study has several limitations, some of which we hope to address in future work.
One is that we have focused on macroeconomic variables at the expense of variables that
capture the structure of the banking system and, more generally, of financial markets that are
likely to play an important role. Aspects such as the degree of capitalization of banks, the
33degree of concentration and the structure of competition of the market for credit, the
liquidity of the interbank market and of the bond market, the ownership structure of the
banks (public versus private), the quality of regulatory supervision, and so on ought to be
controlled for but are neglected here because of lack of data. Perhaps a study limited to a
smaller set of countries that includes more structural variables could yield interesting results,
and allow us to control for the quality of impact of the regulatory response to the crisis.
Another direction for future work is to develop a structural macro-model of the economy in
which the banking sector plays an explicit role; with the help of such a model, it should be
possible to obtain a more precise interpretation for the reduced form coefficients estimated
liere.
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35Table 2. Banking Crisis Determinants - Single Crisis
Dependent variable takes the value I if there is a crisis and 0 if there is no crisis. Time-series cross-
country data are pooled over the 1980-1994 time period. Observations after the the first crisis are omitted.
We estimate the probability P(t) of a financial crisis after taking the logit transformation of P(t).  Standard
errors are given in paranthesis.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Macro Variables:
GROWTH  -.067***  -.136***  -.252***  -.228***
(.025)  (.039)  (.063)  (.059)
TOTCHANGE  -.030*  -.025  -.043*  -.045
(.019)  (.020)  (.027)  (.032)
DEPRECIATION  .002  -.001  -.002  -.012
(.006)  (.007)  (.008)  (.012)
RL. INTEREST  .088***  .086***  .131***  .113***
(.024)  (.025)  (.039)  (.035)
INFLATION  .040***  .044***  .053**  079**
(.016)  (.018)  (.023)  (.035)
SURPLUS/GDP  .012  .024  .016  .013
(.034)  (.036)  (.053)  (.048)
Financial Variables:
M2/RESERVES  .012**  .014**  .018**
(.005)  (.007)  (.009)
PRIVATE/GDP  .019*  .033**  .009
(.012)  (.015)  (.010)
CASH/BANK  .009  .018  -.049
(.016)  (.023)  (.039)
CREDIT GROt-2  .007  .022**  -.003
(.012)  (.010)  (.020)
Institutional Variables:
GDP/CAP  -.034  -.090*  -.158**
(.033)  (.055)  (.079)
DEPOSIT INS.  1.415**
(.738)
LAW&  ORDER  -.516**
(.238)
No. of Crisis  28  26  20  18
No. of Obs.  546  493  395  268
% total correct  74  77  79  67
% crisis correct  61  58  55  61
% no-crisis correct  75  78  81  67
model  2  31.88***  40.86***  53.79***  30.37***
AIC  204  187  131  126
*,  **and ***  indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
36Table 3. Banking Crisis Determinants:  Multiple Crises
Dependent  variable  takes  the value I if there  is a crisis  and the value  0 if there  is no crisis.  Observations  for the
duration  of the crises  are omitted.  Multiple  crises  are included. Time-series  cross-country  data  are pooled  over the
1980-1994  time period. We  estimate  the probability  P(t) of a financial  crisis  after taking  the logit  transformation  of
P(t).  Standard errors are given in paranthesis.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Macro Variables:
GROWTH  -.076***  -.149***  -.254***  -.226***
(.024)  (.040)  (.059)  (.056)
TOT CHANGE  -.027  -.025  -.034  -.035
(.019)  (.020)  (.027)  (.028)
DEPRECIATION  .008  .006  .006  .001
(.006)  (.006)  (.007)  (.007)
RL. INTEREST  .067***  .072***  .106***  .083***
(.020)  (.022)  (.034)  (.028)
INFLATION  .023**  .035***  .037**  .043  *  *
(.012)  (.013)  (.018)  (.020)
SURPLUS/GDP  -.016  -.009  -.032  -.008
(.030)  (.032)  (.049)  (.043)
Financial Variables:
M2/RESERVES  .016***  .016***  .021***
(.006)  (.007)  (.009)
PRIVATEIGDP  .013  .024*  -.001
(.013)  (.015)  (.011)
CASH/BANK  -.013  -.004  -.046*
(.019)  (.025)  (.031)
CREDIT GRO t-2  .011  .024***  .007
(.010)  (.009)  (.014)
Institutional Variables:
GDP/CAP  -.032  -.089*  -.126*
(.033)  (.056)  (.071)
DEPOSIT INS.  1.130**
(.630)
LAW & ORDER  -.389*
(.218)
Past Crisis:
DURATION of  .157***  .180***  .119*  .219**
last period  (.053)  (.059)  (.075)  (.089)
No. of Crisis  31  29  23  20
No. of Obs.  645  581  483  350
% correct  75  77  84  74
% crisis correct  55  66  70  65
% no-crisis correct  76  77  84  75
model  2  42.63***  55.54***  64.15***  37.86***
AIC  224  201  149  141
*, **and ***  indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
37Table 4. The Model As An Early Warning System
The model used is specification (3) from Table 3. The cut-off probability is equal to
the in sample crisis frequency, which is .05.
Country  Crisis Date  Not  Predicted as  Predicted as  Predicted as
predicted as  a crisis in  a crisis  a crisis
a crisis  the year of  starting 1  starting 3
the crisis  year prior  or more
years prior
Colombia  1982  X
Finland  1991  X
Indonesia  1992  X
India  1991  X
Israel  1983  X
Italy  1990  X
Jordan  1989  X
Japan  1992  X
Kenya  1993  X
SriLanka  1989  X
Mexico  1982  X
1994  X
Malaysia  1985  X
Nigeria  1991  X
Norway  1987  X
Philippines  1981  X
Portugal  1986  X
Turkey  1991  X
1994  X
US  1981  X
Uruguay  1981  X
Venezuela  1993  X
S. Africa  1985  X
Percent in  23 crisis  26  35  26  13
each  episodes
category
38Table  5. Interpreting  Regression  Coefficients  - 1994  Mexican  Crisis
The model used is specification (3) from Table 3. Given a change in an explanatory
variable the change in the probability of a crisis depends on the country's  initial crisis
probability, thus on the initial values of all the independent variables and their
estimated coefficients.  Below, we calculate the impact of a given change in the
variables with significant coefficients on the predicted probability of the 1994
Mexican crisis.
Initial Value  Percent Change in  Percent Change in
Initial Value  the Probability of
Crisis
GROWTH  3.7  +10  -7.0***
RL. INTEREST  6.7  +10  +5.6***
INFLATION  7.3  +10  +2.2**
M2/RESERVES  20.5  +10  +2.7***
PRIVATE/GDP  39.7  +10  +7.8*
CREDIT GROt-2  28.9  +10  +5.4***
GDP/CAP  1830  +10  -1.7*
DEPOSIT INS.  1 (=explicit)  -100 (O=implicit)  -61.6*
*,  *and *** indicate  significance  levels  of 10, 5 and I percent  respectively.
39Table 6. Determinants of Cost of Crisis
Dependent variable is the cost of the crisis as a percentage of GDP. The regression is estimated using
Ordinary Least Squares. Independent variables correspond to the year of the crisis unless otherwise
noted.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in paranthesis.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
GROWTH  .580  .313  -1.119***  -1.233***
(.407)  (.279)  (.393)  (.389)
TOTCHANGE  -.215  -.025  -1.226***  1.470*  *  *
(.223)  (.200)  (.285)  (.347)
DEPRECIATION  .016  .083*  .157***  .037
(.077)  (.049)  (.054)  (.069)
RL. INTEREST  .466***  .564***  .456***  .281  *
(.143)  (.131)  (.093)  (.150)
INFLATION  .454***  .533***  .417***  .273**
(.142)  (.129)  (.087)  (.138)
CASH/BANK  -.338***  .197  .266
(.112)  (.151)  (.170)
M2/RESERVES  .151***  .232***
(.057)  (.050)
PRIVATE/GDP  .362***  .215**
(.127)  (.122)
CREDIT GROt-2  .174  .289***
(.112)  (.095)
GDP/CAP  .531  .281
(.311)  (.337)
DEPOSIT INS  8.242**  11.699***
(3.460)  (3.340)




Adj. R2  .32  .40  .43  .54
No. of Obs.  24  24  19  19
*,  **and ***  indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
40APPENDIX I
SAMPLE COMPOSITION  AND DATA SOURCES
The countries included in the largest sample (regression no. 1 in Table 3) are
the following: Austria, Australia, Burundi, Belgium, Bahrain, Canada, Switzerland,
Chile, Congo, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, India,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Mali,
Malaysia, Niger, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Peru,
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Paraguay, Senegal, Singapore, El Salvador,
Sweden, Swaziland, Seychelles, Syria, Togo, Thailand, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda,
Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, South Africa, Zaire, Zambia.
For most countries the years included are 1981-94; for some countries,
however, a shorter subperiod was included because of lack of data. Thus, some
countries in the sample had a banking crisis during 1981-94, but because of missing
data in the years of the crisis that crisis does not appear in Table 1 (Chile, Thailand,
and Peru are such examples). The following table provides details on the composition
of each of the samples used.
41Table A.1: Composition  of the Samples
Regression 2, multiple crises  United Kingdom, Sweden, Zaire
Regression 3, multiple crises  Burundi, Bahrain, Congo, Cyprus, Gabon,
United Kingdom, Guyana, Mali, Niger, Nepal,
Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Singapore,
Sweden, Swaziland, Seychelles, Tanzania,
Zaire
Regression 4, multiple crises  Burundi, Congo, United Kingdom, Niger,
Nepal, Senegal, Singapore, Swaziland,
Seychelles, Zaire
Regression  1, single crisis  Chile, Peru, Turkey
Regression 2, single crisis  Chile, United Kingdom, Peru, Singapore,
Sweden, Turkey, Zaire
Regression 3, single crisis  Burundi, Bahrain, Chile, Congo, Cyprus,
Gabon, United Kingdom, Guyana, Mali,
Niger, Nepal, Peru, Papua New Guinea,
Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Swaziland,
Seychelles, Turkey, Tanzania, Zaire
Regression 4, single crisis  Burundi, Bahrain, Chile, Congo, Cyprus,
Gabon, United Kingdom, Guyana, Israel, Mali,
Niger, Nepal, Peru, Papua New Guinea,
Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Swaziland,
Seychelles, Turkey, Tanzania, Zaire
42Table A.2:  Description of the Explanatory Variables and Sources
Variable  Name  Definition  Source
Growth  Rate of growth  of real  GDP  IFS data base  where available.  Otherwise,
per capita  WEO  data base.
Tot change  Change  in the terms of  IFS
trade
Depreciation  Rate of change  of the  IFS
exchange  rate
Real interest  rate  Nominal  interest  rate minus  IFS.  Where  available,  nominal  rate on
rate  of inflation  short-term  government  securities.
Otherwise,  a rate charged  by the Central
Bank  to domestic  banks such as the
discount  rate; otherwise,  the commercial
bank deposit  interest  rate
Inflation  Rate  of change  of the GDP  IFS
deflator
Surplus/GDP  Ratio  of Central  IFS
Government  budget surplus
to GDP
M2/reserves  Ratio  of M2 to foreign  M2 is money  plus quasi-money  (lines 34 +
exchange  reserves  of the  35 from the IFS). Reserves  are from the
Central  Bank  IFS.
Private/GDP  Ratio  of domestic  credit  to  Domestic  credit to the private  sector is line
the private  sector  to GDP  32d  from the IFS.
Cash/bank  Ratio  of bank liquid  Bank reserves  are line  20 of the IFS.  Bank
reserves  to bank assets  assets  are lines  21 + lines  22a to 22f of the
IFS.
Credit  growth  Growth  rate of real  see above
domestic  credit
Deposit  insurance  Dummy  variable  for the  Data from Kyei (1995)  and Talley  and Mas
presence  of an explicit  (1990)
deposit  insurance  scheme
Law and order  An index of the quality  of  International  Country  Risk Guide
law enforcement
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